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Abstract
This work presents a distributed method for control centers to monitor the operating condition of a power network, i.e., to
estimate the network state, and to ultimately determine the occurrence of threatening situations. State estimation has been
recognized to be a fundamental task for network control centers to ensure correct and safe functionalities of power grids.
We consider (static) state estimation problems, in which the state vector consists of the voltage magnitude and angle at
all network buses. We consider the state to be linearly related to network measurements, which include power flows, current
injections, and voltages phasors at some buses. We admit the presence of several cooperating control centers, and we design two
distributed methods for them to compute the minimum variance estimate of the state given the network measurements. The
two distributed methods rely on different modes of cooperation among control centers: in the first method an incremental mode
of cooperation is used, whereas, in the second method, a diffusive interaction is implemented. Our procedures, which require
each control center to know only the measurements and structure of a subpart of the whole network, are computationally
efficient and scalable with respect to the network dimension, provided that the number of control centers also increases with
the network cardinality. Additionally, a finite-memory approximation of our diffusive algorithm is proposed, and its accuracy
is characterized. Finally, our estimation methods are exploited to develop a distributed algorithm to detect corrupted data
among the network measurements.
1 Introduction
Large-scale complex systems, such as, for instance, the electrical power grid and the telecommunication system,
are receiving increasing attention from researchers in different fields. The wide spatial distribution and the high
dimensionality of these systems preclude the use of centralized solutions to tackle classical estimation, control,
and fault detection problems, and they require, instead, the development of new decentralized techniques. One
possibility to overcome these issues is to geographically deploy some monitors in the network, each one responsible
for a different subpart of the whole system. Local estimation and control schemes can successively be used, together
with an information exchange mechanism to recover the performance of a centralized scheme.
1.1 Control centers, state estimation and cyber security in power networks
Power systems are operated by system operators from the area control center. The main goal of the system operator
is to maintain the network in a secure operating condition, in which all the loads are supplied power by the generators
without violating the operational limits on the transmission lines. In order to accomplish this goal, at a given point
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Fig. 1. In Fig. 1(a), remote terminal units (RTU) transmit their measurements to a SCADA terminal via a LAN network.
The data is then sent to a Control Center to implement network estimation, control, and optimization procedures. Fig. 1(b)
shows the diagram of the IEEE 118 bus system (courtesy of the IIT Power Group). The network has 118 buses, 186 branches,
99 loads, and 54 generators.
in time, the network model and the phasor voltages at every system bus need to be determined, and preventive
actions have to be taken if the system is found in an insecure state. For the determination of the operating state,
remote terminal units and measuring devices are deployed in the network to gather measurements. These devices
are then connected via a local area network to a SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) terminal,
which supports the communication of the collected measurements to a control center. At the control center, the
measurement data is used for control and optimization functions, such as contingency analysis, automatic generation
control, load forecasting, optimal power flow computation, and reactive power dispatch [1]. A diagram representing
the interconnections between remote terminal units and the control center is reported in Fig. 1(a). Various sources
of uncertainties, e.g., measurement and communication noise, lead to inaccuracies in the received data, which may
affect the performance of the control and optimization algorithms, and, ultimately, the stability of the power plant.
This concern was first recognized and addressed in [27,28,29] by introducing the idea of (static) state estimation in
power systems.
Power network state estimators are broadly used to obtain an optimal estimate from redundant noisy measurements,
and to estimate the state of a network branch which, for economical or computational reasons, is not directly
monitored. For the power system state estimation problem, several centralized and parallel solutions have been
developed in the last decades, e.g., see [19,8,30]. Being an online function, computational issues, storage requirements,
and numerical robustness of the solution algorithm need to be taken into account. Within this regard, distributed
algorithms based on network partitioning techniques are to be preferred over centralized ones. Moreover, even in
decentralized setting, the work in [20] on the blackout of August 2003 suggests that an estimation of the entire
network is essential to prevent networks damages. In other words, the whole state vector should be estimated by
and available to every unit. The references [34,12] explore the idea of using a global control center to coordinate
estimates obtained locally by several local control centers. In this work, we improve upon these prior results by
proposing a fully decentralized and distributed estimation algorithm, which, by only assuming local knowledge of
the network structure by the local control centers, allows them to obtain in finite time an optimal estimate of the
network state. Being the computation distributed among the control centers, our procedure appears scalable against
the power network dimension, and, furthermore, numerically reliable and accurate.
A second focus of this paper is false data detection and cyber attacks in power systems. Because of the increasing
reliance of modern power systems on communication networks, the possibility of cyber attacks is a real threat
[18]. One possibility for the attacker is to corrupt the data coming from the measuring units and directed to the
control center, in order to introduce arbitrary errors in the estimated state, and, consequently, to compromise the
performance of control and optimization algorithms [14]. This important type of attack is often referred in the
power systems literature to as false data injection attack. Recently, the authors of [33] show that a false data
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injection attack, in addition to destabilizing the grid, may also lead to fluctuations in the electricity market, causing
significant economical losses. The presence of false data is classically checked by analyzing the statistical properties
of the estimation residual z −Hxˆ, where z is the measurements vector, xˆ is a state estimate, and H is the state to
measurements matrix. For an attack to be successful, the residual needs to remain within a certain confidence level.
Accordingly, one approach to circumvent false data injection attacks is to increase the number of measurements so
as to obtain a more accurate confidence bound. Clearly, by increasing the number of measurements, the data to be
transmitted to the control center increases, and the dimension of the estimation problem grows. By means of our
estimation method, we address this dimensionality problem by distributing the false data detection problem among
several control centers.
1.2 Related work on distributed estimation and projection methods
Starting from the eighties, the problem of distributed estimation has attracted intense attention from the scientific
community, generating along the years a very rich literature. More recently, because of the advent of highly integrated
and low-cost wireless devices as key components of large autonomous networks, the interest for this classical topic has
been renewed. For a wireless sensor network, novel applications requiring efficient distributed estimation procedures
include, for instance, environment monitoring, surveillance, localization, and target tracking. Considerable effort has
been devoted to the development of distributed and adaptive filtering schemes, which generalize the notion of adaptive
estimation to a setup involving networked sensing and processing devices [4]. In this context, relevant methods include
incremental Least Mean-Square [15], incremental Recursive Least-Square [24], Diffusive Least Mean-Square [24], and
Diffusive Recursive Least-Square[4]. Diffusion Kalman filtering and smoothing algorithms are proposed, for instance,
in [3,5], and consensus based techniques in [25,26]. We remark that the strategies proposed in the aforementioned
references could be adapted for the solution of the power network static estimation problem. Their assumptions,
however, appear to be not well suited in our context for the following reasons. First, the convergence of the above
estimation algorithms is only asymptotic, and it depends upon the communication topology. As a matter of fact, for
many communication topologies, such as Cayley graphs and random geometric graphs, the convergence rate is very
slow and scales badly with the network dimension. Such slow convergence rate is clearly undesirable because a delayed
state estimation could lead the power plant to instability. Second, approaches based on Kalman filtering require the
knowledge of the global state and observation model by all the components of the network, and they violate therefore
our assumptions. Third and finally, the application of these methods to the detection of cyber attacks, which is also
our goal, is not straightforward, especially when detection guarantees are required. An exception is constituted by
[31], where a estimation technique based on local Kalman filters and a consensus strategy is developed. This latter
method, however, besides exhibiting asymptotic convergence, does not offer guarantees on the final estimation error.
Our estimation technique belongs to the family of Kaczmarz (row-projection) methods for the solution of a linear
system of equations. See [13,11,32,6] for a detailed discussion. Differently from the existing row-action methods, our
algorithms exhibit finite time convergence towards the exact solution, and they can be used to compute any weighted
least squares solution to a system of linear equations.
1.3 Our contributions
The contributions of this work are threefold. First, we adopt the static state network estimation model, in which the
state vector is linearly related to the network measurements. We develop two methods for a group of interconnected
control centers to compute an optimal estimate of the system state via distributed computation. Our first estimation
algorithm assumes an incremental mode of cooperation among the control centers, while our second estimation
algorithm is based upon a diffusive strategy. Both methods are shown to converge in a finite number of iterations,
and to require only local information for their implementation. Differently than [23], our estimation procedures
assume neither the measurement error covariance nor the measurements matrix to be diagonal. Furthermore, our
algorithms are advantageous from a communication perspective, since they reduce the distance between remote
terminal units and the associated control center, and from a computational perspective, since they distribute the
measurements to be processed among the control centers. Second, as a minor contribution, we describe a finite-time
algorithm to detect via distributed computation if the measurements have been corrupted by a malignant agent. Our
detection method is based upon our state estimation technique, and it inherits its convergence properties. Notice that,
since we assume the measurements to be corrupted by noise, the possibility exists for an attacker to compromise the
network measurements while remaining undetected (by injecting for instance a vector with the same noise statistics).
With respect to this limitation, we characterize the class of corrupted vectors that are guaranteed to be detected
by our procedure, and we show optimality with respect to a centralized detection algorithm. Third, we study the
scalability of our methods in networks of increasing dimension, and we derive a finite-memory approximation of our
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diffusive estimation strategy. For this approximation procedure we show that, under a reasonable set of assumptions
and independent of the network dimension, each control center is able to recover a good approximation of the state
of a certain subnetwork through little computation. Moreover, we provide bounds on the approximation error for
each subnetwork. Finally, we illustrate the effectiveness of our procedures on the IEEE 118 bus system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the problem under consideration, and we
describe the mathematical setup. Section 3 contains our main results on the state estimation and on the detection
problem, as well as our algorithms. Section 4 describes our approximated state estimation algorithm. In Section 5 we
study the IEEE 118 bus system, and we present some simulation results. Finally, Section 6 contains our conclusion.
2 Problem setup and preliminary notions
For a power network, an example of which is reported in Fig. 1(b), the state at a certain instant of time consists
of the voltage angles and magnitudes at all the system buses. The (static) state estimation problem introduced
in the seminal work by Schweppe [27] refers to the procedure of estimating the state of a power network given a
set of measurements of the network variables, such as, for instance, voltages, currents, and power flows along the
transmission lines. To be more precise, let x ∈ Rn and z ∈ Rp be, respectively, the state and measurements vector.
Then, the vectors x and z are related by the relation
z = h(x) + η, (1)
where h(·) is a nonlinear measurement function, and where η, which is traditionally assumed to be a zero mean
random vector satisfying E[ηηT] = Ση = ΣTη > 0, is the noise measurement. An optimal estimate of the network state
coincides with the most likely vector xˆ that solves equation (1). It should be observed that, instead of by solving the
above estimation problem, the network state could be obtained by measuring directly the voltage phasors by means
of phasor measurement devices. 1 Such an approach, however, would be economically expensive, since it requires to
deploy a phasor measurement device at each network bus, and it would be very vulnerable to communication failures
[1]. In this work, we adopt the approximated estimation model presented in [28], which follows from the linearization
around the origin of equation (1). Specifically,
z = Hx+ v, (2)
where H ∈ Rp×n and where v, the noise measurement, is such that E[v] = 0 andE[vvT] = Σ = ΣT > 0. Observe
that, because of the interconnection structure of a power network, the measurement matrix H is usually sparse. Let
Ker(H) denote the null space defined by the matrix H. For the equation (2), without affecting generality, assume
Ker(H) = {0}, and recall from [17] that the vector
xwls = (H
TΣ−1H)−1HTΣ−1z (3)
minimizes the weighted variance of the estimation error, i.e., xwls = arg minxˆ(z −Hxˆ)TΣ−1(z −Hxˆ).
The centralized computation of the minimum variance estimate to (2) assumes the complete knowledge of the matrices
H and Σ, and it requires the inversion of the matrix HTΣ−1H. For a large power network, such computation imposes
a limitation on the dimension of the matrix H, and hence on the number of measurements that can be efficiently
processed to obtain a real-time state estimate. Since the performance of network control and optimization algorithms
depend upon the precision of the state estimate, a limitation on the network measurements constitutes a bottleneck
toward the development of a more efficient power grid. A possible solution to address this complexity problem is
to distribute the computation of xwls among geographically deployed control centers (monitors), in a way that each
monitor is responsible for a subpart of the whole network. To be more precise, let the matrices H and Σ, and the
1 Phasor measurement units are devices that synchronize by using GPS signals, and that allow for a direct measurement of
voltage and current phasors.
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vector z be partitioned as 2
H =

H1
H2
...
Hm
 , Σ =

Σ1
Σ2
...
Σm
 , z =

z1
z2
...
zm
 , (4)
where, for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, mi ∈ N, Hi ∈ Rmi×n, Σi ∈ Rmi×p, zi ∈ Rmi , and
∑m
i=1mi = p. Let G = (V, E) be a
connected graph in which each vertex i ∈ V = {1, . . . ,m} denotes a monitor, and E ∈ V × V denotes the set of
monitors interconnections. For i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, assume that monitor i knows the matrices Hi, Σi, and the vector zi.
Moreover, assume that two neighboring monitors are allowed to cooperate by exchanging information. Notice that, if
the full matrices H and Σ are nowhere available, and if they cannot be used for the computation of xwls, then, with
no cooperation among the monitors, the vector xwls cannot be computed by any of the monitor. Hence we consider
the following problem.
Problem 1 (Distributed state estimation) Design an algorithm for the monitors to compute the minimum vari-
ance estimate of the network state via distributed computation.
We now introduce the second problem addressed in this work. Given the distributed nature of a power system and
the increasing reliance on local area networks to transmit data to a control center, there exists the possibility for an
attacker to compromise the network functionality by corrupting the measurements vector. When a malignant agent
corrupts some of the measurements, the state to measurements relation becomes
z = Hx+ v + w,
where the vector w ∈ Rp is chosen by the attacker, and, therefore, it is unknown and unmeasurable by any of the
monitoring stations. We refer to the vector w to as false data. From the above equation, it should be observed that
there exist vectors w that cannot be detected through the measurements z. For instance, if the false data vector is
intentionally chosen such that w ∈ Im(H), then the attack cannot be detected through the measurements z. Indeed,
denoting with † the pseudoinverse operation, the vector x+H†w is a valid network state. In this work, we assume
that the vector w is detectable from the measurements z, and we consider the following problem.
Problem 2 (Distributed detection) Design an algorithm for the monitors to detect the presence of false data in
the measurements via distributed computation.
As it will be clear in the sequel, the complexity of our methods depends upon the dimension of the state, as well
as the number of monitors. In particular, few monitors should be used in the absence of severe computation and
communication contraints, while many monitors are preferred otherwise. We believe that a suitable choice of the
number of monitors depends upon the specific scenario, and it is not further discussed in this work.
Remark 1 (Generality of our methods) In this paper we focus on the state estimation and the false data detec-
tion problem for power systems, because this field of research is currently receiving sensible attention from different
communities. The methods described in the following sections, however, are general, and they have applicability
beyond the power network scenario. For instance, our procedures can be used for state estimation and false data
detection in dynamical system, as described in [21] for the case of sensors networks.
3 Optimal state estimation and false data detection via distributed computation
The objective of this section is the design of distributed methods to compute an optimal state estimate from
measurements. With respect to a centralized method, in which a powerful central processor is in charge of processing
2 In most application the error covariance matrix is assumed to be diagonal, so that each submatrix Σi is very sparse.
However, we do not impose any particular structure on the error covariance matrix.
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Algorithm 1 Incremental minimum norm solution (i-th monitor)
Input: Hi, zi;
Require: [zT1 . . . z
T
m]
T ∈ Im([HT1 . . . HTm]T);
if i = 1 then
xˆ0 := 0, K0 := In;
else
receive xˆi−1 and Ki−1 from monitor i− 1;
end if
xˆi := xˆi−1 +Ki−1(HiKi−1)†(zi −Hixˆi−1);
Ki := Basis(Ki−1 Ker(HiKi−1));
if i < m then
transmit xˆi and Ki to monitor i+ 1;
else
return xˆm;
end if
all the data, our procedures require the computing units to have access to only a subset of the measurements, and
are shown to reduce significantly the computational burden. In addition to being convenient for the implementation,
our methods are also optimal, in the sense that they maintain the same estimation accuracy of a centralized method.
For a distributed method to be implemented, the interaction structure among the computing units needs to be
defined. Here we consider two modes of cooperations among the computing units, and, namely, the incremental and
the diffusive interaction. In an incremental mode of cooperation, information flows in a sequential manner from one
node to the adjacent one. This setting, which usually requires the least amount of communications [22], induces a
cyclic interaction graph among the processors. In a diffusive strategy, instead, each node exchanges information with
all (or a subset of) its neighbors as defined by an interaction graph. In this case, the amount of communication and
computation is higher than in the incremental case, but each node possesses a good estimate before the termination
of the algorithm, since it improves its estimate at each communication round. This section is divided into three parts.
In Section 3.2, we first develop a distributed incremental method to compute the minimum norm solution to a set
of linear equations, and then exploit such method to solve a minimum variance estimation problem. In Section 3.3
we derive a diffusive strategy which is amenable to asynchronous implementation. Finally, in Section 3.4 we propose
a distributed algorithm for the detection of false data among the measurements. Our detection procedure requires
the computation of the minimum variance state estimate, for which either the incremental or the diffusive strategy
can be used.
3.1 Incremental solution to a set of linear equations
We start by introducing a distributed incremental procedure to compute the minimum norm solution to a set of
linear equations. This procedure constitutes the key ingredient of the incremental method we later propose to solve
the minimum variance estimation problem. Let H ∈ Rp×m, and let z ∈ Im(H), where Im(H) denotes the range space
spanned by the matrix H. Consider the system of linear equations z = Hx, and recall that the unique minimum
norm solution to z = Hx coincides with the vector xˆ such that z = Hxˆ and ‖xˆ‖2 is minimum. It can be shown
that ‖xˆ‖2 being minimum corresponds to xˆ being orthogonal to the null space Ker(H) of H [17]. Let H and z be
partitioned in m blocks as in (4), and let G = (V, E) be a directed graph such that V = {1, . . . ,m} corresponds to the
set of monitors, and, denoting with (i, j) the directed edge from j to i, E = {(i+ 1, i) : i = 1, . . . ,m− 1} ∪ {(1,m)}.
Our incremental procedure to compute the minimum norm solution to z = Hxˆ is in Algorithm 1, where, given a
subspace V, we write Basis(V) to denote any full rank matrix whose columns span the subspace V. We now proceed
with the analysis of the convergence properties of the Incremental minimum norm solution algorithm.
Theorem 3.1 (Convergence of Algorithm 1) Let z = Hx, where H and z are partitioned in m row-blocks as in (4).
In Algorithm 1, the m-th monitor returns the vector xˆ such that z = Hxˆ and xˆ ⊥ Ker(H).
PROOF. See Section 6.1.
It should be observed that the dimension of Ki decreases, in general, when the index i increases. In particular,
Km = {0} and K1 = Ker(H1). To reduce the computational burden of the algorithm, monitor i could transmit the
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smallest among Basis(Ki−1 Ker(HiKi−1)) and Basis(Ki−1 Ker(HiKi−1)⊥), together with a packet containing the
type of the transmitted basis.
Remark 2 (Computational complexity of Algorithm 1) In Algorithm 1, the main operation to be performed
by the i-th agent is a singular value decomposition (SVD). 3 Indeed, since the range space and the null space of a
matrix can be obtained through its SVD, both the matrices (HiKi−1)† and Basis(Ki−1 Ker(HiKi−1)) can be recovered
from the SVD of HiKi−1. Let H ∈ Rm×n, m > n, and assume the presence of dm/ke monitors, 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Recall
that, for a matrix M ∈ Rk×p, the singular value decomposition can be performed with complexity O(min{kp2, k2p})
[10]. Hence, the computational complexity of computing a minimum norm solution to the system z = Hx is O(mn2).
In Table 1 we report the computational complexity of Algorithm 1 as a function of the size k.
Table 1
Computational complexity of Algorithm 1.
Block size I-th complexity Total complexity Communications
k ≤ n O(k2n) O(mkn) dm/ke − 1
k > n O(kn2) O(mn2) dm/ke − 1
The following observations are in order. First, if k ≤ n, then the computational complexity sustained by the i-th
monitor is much smaller than the complexity of a centralized implementation, i.e., O(k2n)  O(mn2). Second, the
complexity of the entire algorithm is optimal, since, in the worst case, it maintains the computational complexity of
a centralized solution, i.e., O(mkn) ≤ O(mn2). Third and finally, a compromise exists between the blocks size k and
the number of communications needed to terminate Algorithm 1. In particular, if k = m, then no communication is
needed, while, if k = 1, then m− 1 communication rounds are necessary to terminate the estimation algorithm. 4
3.2 Incremental state estimation via distributed computation
We now focus on the computation of the weighted least squares solution to a set of linear equations. Let v be an
unknown and unmeasurable random vector, with E(v) = 0 and E(vvT) = Σ = ΣT > 0. Consider the system of
equations
z = Hx+ v, (5)
and assume Ker(H) = 0. Notice that, because of the noise vector v, we generally have z 6∈ Im(H), so that Algorithm
1 cannot be directly employed to compute the vector xwls defined in (3). It is possible, however, to recast the above
weighted least squares estimation problem to be solvable with Algorithm 1. Note that, because the matrix Σ is
symmetric and positive definite, there exists 5 a full row rank matrix B such that Σ = BBT. Then, equation (5) can
be rewritten as
z =
[
H εB
] [ x
v¯
]
, (6)
where ε ∈ R>0, E[v¯] = 0 and E[v¯v¯T] = ε−2I. Observe that, because B has full row rank, the system (6) is
underdetermined, i.e., z ∈ Im([H εB]) and Ker([H εB]) 6= 0. Let[
xˆ(ε)
ˆ¯v
]
=
[
H εB
]†
z. (7)
The following theorem characterizes the relation between the minimum variance estimation xwls and xˆ(ε).
3 The matrix H is usually very sparse, since it reflects the network interconnection structure. Efficient SVD algorithms for
very large sparse matrices are being developed (cf. SVDPACK ).
4 Additional m− 1 communication rounds are needed to transmit the estimation to every other monitor.
5 Choose for instance B = WΛ1/2, where W is a basis of eigenvectors of Σ and Λ is the corresponding diagonal matrix of the
eigenvalues.
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Theorem 3.2 (Convergence with ε) Consider the system of linear equations z = Hx + v. Let E(v) = 0 and
E(vvT) = Σ = BBT > 0 for a full row rank matrix B. Let
C = ε(I −HH†)B, E = I − C†C, D = εE[I + ε2EBT(HHT)†BE]−1BT(HHT)†(I − εBC†).
Then
[
H εB
]†
=
[
H† − εH†B(C† +D)
C† +D
]
;
and
lim
ε→0+
H† − εH†B(C† +D) = (HTΣ−1H)−1HTΣ−1.
PROOF. See Section 6.2.
Throughout the paper, let xˆ(ε) be the vector defined in (7), and notice that Theorem 3.2 implies that
xwls = lim
ε→0+
xˆ(ε).
Remark 3 (Incremental state estimation) For the system of equations z = Hx+ v, let BBT be the covariance
matrix of the noise vector v, and let
H =

H1
H2
...
Hm
 , B =

B1
B2
...
Bm
 , z =

z1
z2
...
zm
 , (8)
where mi ∈ N, Hi ∈ Rmi×n, Bi ∈ Rmi×p, and zi ∈ Rmi . For ε > 0, the estimate xˆ(ε) of the weighted least squares
solution to z = Hx+ v can be computed by means of Algorithm 1 with input [Hi εBi] and zi.
Observe now that the estimate xˆ(ε) coincides with xˆwls only in the limit for ε→ 0+. When the parameter ε is fixed,
the estimate xˆ(ε) differs from the minimum variance estimate xˆwls. We next characterize the approximation error
xwls − xˆ(ε).
Corollary 3.1 (Approximation error) Consider the system z = Hx+ v, and let E[vvT] = BBT for a full row rank
matrix B. Then
xwls − xˆ(ε) = εH†BDz,
where D is as in Theorem 3.2.
PROOF. With the same notation as in the proof of Theorem 3.2, for every value of ε > 0, the difference xwls− xˆ(ε)
equals
(
(HTΣ−1H)−1HTΣ−1 −H† + εH†B(C† +D)) z. Since (HTΣ−1H)−1HTΣ−1 −H† + εH†BC† = 0 for every
ε > 0, it follows xwls − xˆ(ε) = εH†BDz.
Therefore, for the solution of system (5) by means of Algorithm 1, the parameter ε is chosen according to Corollary
3.1 to meet a desired estimation accuracy. It should be observed that, even if the entire matrix H needs to be known
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for the computation of the exact parameter ε, the advantages of our estimation technique are preserved. Indeed, if
the matrix H is unknown and an upper bound for ‖H†BDz‖ is known, then a value for ε can still be computed that
guarantees the desired estimation accuracy. On the other hand, even if H is entirely known, it may be inefficient
to use H to perform a centralized state estimation over time. Instead, the parameter ε needs to be computed only
once. To conclude this section, we characterize the estimation residual z −Hxˆ. This quantity plays an important
role for the synthesis of a distributed false data detection algorithm.
Corollary 3.2 (Estimation residual) Consider the system z = Hx+ v, and let E[vvT] = Σ = ΣT > 0. Then 6
lim
ε→0+
‖z −Hxˆ(ε)‖ ≤ ‖(I −HW )‖‖v‖,
where W = (HTΣ−1H)−1HTΣ−1.
PROOF. By virtue of Theorem 3.2 we have limε→0+ xˆ(ε) = xwls = (HTΣ−1H)−1HTΣ−1z = Wz. Observe that
HWH = H, and recall that z = Hx+ v. For any matrix norm, we have
‖z −Hxwls‖ = ‖z −HWz‖ = ‖(I −HW )(Hx+ v)‖ = ‖Hx−Hx+ (I −HW )v‖ ≤ ‖(I −HW )‖‖v‖,
and the theorem follows.
3.3 Diffusive state estimation via distributed computation
The implementation of the incremental state estimation algorithm described in Section 3.2 requires a certain degree
of coordination among the control centers. For instance, an ordering of the monitors is necessary, such that the i-th
monitor transmits its estimate to the (i + 1)-th monitor. This requirement imposes a constraint on the monitors
interconnection structure, which may be undesirable, and, potentially, less robust to link failures. In this section, we
overcome this limitation by presenting a diffusive implementation of Algorithm 1, which only requires the monitors
interconnection structure to be connected. 7 To be more precise, let V = {1, . . . ,m} be the set of monitors, and
let G = (V,E) be the undirected graph describing the monitors interconnection structure, where E ⊆ V × V , and
(i, j) ∈ E if and only if the monitors i and j are connected. The neighbor set of node i is defined as Ni = {j ∈ V :
(i, j) ∈ E}. We assume that G is connected, and we let the distance between two vertices be the minimum number of
edges in a path connecting them. Finally, the diameter of a graph G, in short diam(G), equals the greatest distance
between any pair of vertices. Our diffusive procedure is described in Algorithm 2, where the matrices Hi and εBi
are as defined in equation (8). During the h-th iteration of the algorithm, monitor i, with i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, performs
the following three actions in order:
(i) transmits its current estimates xˆi and Ki to all its neighbors;
(ii) receives the estimates xˆj from neighbors Ni; and
(iii) updates xˆi and Ki as in the for loop of Algorithm 2.
We next show the convergence of Algorithm 2 to the minimum variance estimate.
Theorem 3.3 (Convergence of Algorithm 2) Consider the system of linear equations z = Hx+v, where E[v] =
0 and E[vvT] = BBT. Let H, B and z be partitioned as in (8), and let ε > 0. Let the monitors communication graph
be connected, let d be its diameter, and let the monitors execute the Diffusive state estimation algorithm. Then, each
monitor computes the estimate xˆ(ε) of x in d steps.
PROOF. Let xˆi be the estimate of the monitor i, and let Ki be such that x − xˆi ∈ Im(Ki), where x denotes the
network state, and xˆi ⊥ Im(Ki). Notice that zi = [Hi εBi]xˆi, where zi it the i-th measurements vector. Let i and j
6 Given a vector v and a matrix H, we denote by ‖v‖ any vector norm, and by ‖H‖ the corresponding induced matrix norm.
7 An undirected graph is said to be connected if there exists a path between any two vertices [9].
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Algorithm 2 Diffusive state estimation (i-th monitor)
Input: Hi, εBi, zi;
xˆi := [Hi εBi]
†zi;
Ki := Basis(Ker([Hi εBi]));
while Ki 6= 0 do
for j ∈ Ni do
receive xˆj and Kj ;
xˆi := xˆi + [Ki 0][−Ki Kj ]†(xˆi − xˆj);
Ki := Basis(Im(Ki) ∩ Im(Kj));
end for
transmit xˆi and Ki;
end while
be two neighboring monitors. Notice that there exist vectors vi and vj such that xˆi+Kivi = xˆj+Kjvj . In particular,
those vectors can be chosen as [
vi
vj
]
= [−Ki Kj ]†(xˆi − xˆj).
It follows that the vector
xˆ+i = xˆi + [Ki 0][−Ki Kj ]†(xˆi − xˆj)
is such that zi = [Hi εBi]xˆ
+
i and zj = [Hj εBj ]xˆ
+
i . Moreover we have xˆ
+
i ⊥ (Im(Ki) ∩ Im(Kj)). Indeed, notice that[
vi
vj
]
⊥ Ker([−Ki Kj ]) ⊇
{[
wi
wj
]
: Kiwi = Kjwj
}
.
We now show that Kivi ⊥ Im(Kj). By contradiction, if Kivi 6⊥ Im(Kj), then vi = v˜i + v¯i, with Kiv˜i ⊥ Im(Kj)
and Kiv¯i ∈ Im(Kj). Let v¯j = K†jKiv¯i, and v˜j = vj − v¯j . Then, [v¯Ti v¯Tj ]T ∈ Ker([−Ki Kj ]), and hence [vTi vTj ]T 6⊥
Ker([−Ki Kj ]), which contradicts the hypothesis. We conclude that [Ki 0][−Ki Kj ]†(xˆi − xˆj) ⊥ Im(Kj), and,
since xˆi ⊥ Im(Ki), it follows xˆ+i ⊥ (Im(Ki) ∩ Im(Kj)). The theorem follows from the fact that after a number of
steps equal to the diameter of the monitors communication graph, each vector xˆi verifies all the measurements, and
xˆi ⊥ Im(K1) ∩ · · · ∩ Im(Km).
As a consequence of Theorem 3.2, in the limit for ε to zero, Algorithm 2 returns the minimum variance estimate
of the state vector, being therefore the diffusive counterpart of Algorithm 1. A detailed comparison between incre-
mental and diffusive methods is beyond the purpose of this work, and we refer the interested reader to [15,16] and
the references therein for a thorough discussion. Here we only underline some key differences. While Algorithm 1
requires less operations, being therefore computationally more efficient, Algorithm 2 does not constraint the monitors
communication graph. Additionally, Algorithm 2 can be implemented adopting general asynchronous communica-
tion protocols. For instance, consider the Asynchronous (diffusive) state estimation algorithm, where, at any given
instant of time in N, at most one monitor, say j, sends its current estimates to its neighbors, and where, for i ∈ Nj ,
monitor i performs the following operations:
(i) xˆi := xˆi + [Ki 0][−Ki Kj ]†(xˆi − xˆj),
(ii) Ki := Basis(Im(Ki) ∩ Im(Kj)).
Corollary 3.3 (Asynchronous estimation) Consider the system of linear equations z = Hx+ v, where E[v] = 0
and E[vvT] = BBT. Let H, B and z be partitioned as in (8), and let ε > 0. Let the monitors communication graph be
connected, let d be its diameter, and let the monitors execute the Asynchronous (diffusive) state estimation algorithm.
Assume that there exists a duration T ∈ N such that, within each time interval of duration T , each monitor transmits
its current estimates to its neighbors. Then, each monitor computes the estimate xˆ(ε) of x within time dT .
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Algorithm 3 False data detection (i-th monitor)
Input: Hi, εBi, Γ;
while True do
collect measurements zi(t);
estimate network state xˆ(t) via Algorithm 1 or 2
if ‖zi(t)−Hixˆ(t)‖∞ > Γ then
return False data detected;
end if
end while
PROOF. The proof follows from the following two facts. First, the intersection of subspaces is a commutative
operation. Second, since each monitor performs a data transmission within any time interval of length T , it follows
that, at time dT , the information related to one monitor has propagated through the network to every other monitor.
3.4 Detection of false data via distributed computation
In the previous sections we have shown how to compute an optimal state estimate via distributed computation. A
rather straightforward application of the proposed state estimation technique is the detection of false data among
the measurements. When the measurements are corrupted, the state to measurements relation becomes
z = Hx+ v + w,
where w is the false data vector. As a consequence of Corollary 3.2, the vector w is detectable if it affects significantly
the estimation residual, i.e., if limε→0 ‖z −Hxˆ(ε)‖ > Γ, where the threshold Γ depends upon the magnitude of the
noise v. Notice that, because false data can be injected at any time by a malignant agent, the detection algorithm
needs to be executed over time by the control centers. Let z(t) be the measurements vector at a given time instant
t, and let E[z(t1)zT(t2)] = 0 for all t1 6= t2. Based on this considerations, our distributed detection procedure is in
Algorithm 3, where the matrices Hi and εBi are as defined in equation (8), and Γ is a predefined threshold.
In Algorithm 3, the value of the threshold Γ determines the false alarm and the misdetection rate. Clearly, if
Γ ≥ ‖(I−HW )‖‖v(t)‖ and ε is sufficiently small, then no false alarm is triggered, at the expenses of the misdetection
rate. By decreasing the value of Γ the sensitivity to failures increases together with the false alarm rate. Notice that, if
the magnitude of the noise signals is bounded by γ, then a reasonable choice of the threshold is Γ = γ‖(I−HW )‖∞,
where the use of the infinity norm in Algorithm 3 is also convenient for the implementation. Indeed, since the
condition ‖z(t)−Hxˆ(t)‖∞ > Γ is equivalent to ‖zi(t)−Hixˆ(t)‖∞ > Γ for some monitor i, the presence of false data
can be independently checked by each monitor without further computation. Notice that an eventual alarm message
needs to be propagated to all other control centers.
Remark 4 (Statistical detection) A different strategy for the detection of false data relies on statistical tech-
niques, e.g., see [1]. In the interest of brevity, we do not consider these methods, and we only remark that, once the
estimation residual has been computed by each monitor, the implementation of a (distributed) statistical procedure,
such as, for instance, the (distributed) χ2-Test, is a straightforward task.
4 A finite-memory estimation technique
The procedure described in Algorithm 1 allows each agent to compute an optimal estimate of the whole network
state in finite time. In this section, we allow each agent to handle only local, i.e., of small dimension, vectors, and
we develop a procedure to recover an estimate of only a certain subnetwork. We envision that the knowledge of only
a subnetwork may be sufficient to implement distributed estimation and control strategies.
We start by introducing the necessary notation. Let the measurements matrix H be partitioned into m2, being m
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the number of monitors in the network, blocks as
H =

H11 · · · H1m
...
...
Hm1 · · · Hmm
 , (9)
where Hij ∈ Rmi×ni for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. The above partitioning reflects a division of the whole network into
competence regions: we let each monitor be responsible for the correct functionality of the subnetwork defined by its
blocks. Additionally, we assume that the union of the different regions covers the whole network, and that different
competence regions may overlap. Observe that, in most of the practical situations, the matrix H has a sparse
structure, so that many blocks Hij have only zero entries. We associate an undirected graph Gh with the matrix H,
in a way that Gh reflects the interconnection structure of the blocks Hij . To be more precise, we let Gh = (Vh, Eh),
where Vh = {1, . . . ,m} denotes the set of monitors, and where, denoting by (i, j) the undirected edge from j to i, it
holds (i, j) ∈ Eh if and only if ‖Hij‖ 6= 0 or ‖Hji‖ 6= 0. Noticed that the structure of the graph Gh, which reflects
the sparsity structure of the measurement matrix, describes also the monitors interconnections. By using the same
partitioning as in (9), the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of H can be written as
H† = H˜ =

H˜11 · · · H˜1m
...
...
H˜m1 · · · H˜mm
 , (10)
where H˜ij ∈ Rni×mi . Assume that H has full row rank, 8 and observe that H† = HT(HHT)−1. Consider the
equation z = Hx, and let H†z = xˆ = [xˆT1 . . . xˆ
T
m], where, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, xˆi ∈ Rni . We employ Algorithm 2
for the computation of the vector xˆ, and we let
xˆ(i,h) =

xˆ
(i,h)
1
...
xˆ
(i,h)
m

be the estimate vector of the i-th monitor after h iterations of Algorithm 2, i.e., after h executions of the while loop
in Algorithm 2. In what follows, we will show that, for a sufficiently sparse matrix H, the error ‖xˆi − xˆ(i,h)i ‖ has an
exponential decay when h increases, so that it becomes negligible before the termination of Algorithm 2, i.e., when
h < diam(Gh). The main result of this section is next stated.
Theorem 4.1 (Local estimation) Let the full-row rank matrix H be partitioned as in (9). Let [a, b], with a < b,
be the smallest interval containing the spectrum of HHT. Then, for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and h ∈ N, there exists C ∈ R>0
and q ∈ (0, 1) such that
‖xˆi − xˆ(i,h)i ‖ ≤ Cq
h
2+1.
Before proving the above result, for the readers convenience, we recall the following definitions and results. Given
an invertible matrix M of dimension n, let us define the support sets
Sh(M) =
h⋃
k=0
{(i, j) : Mk(i, j) 6= 0},
being Mk(i, j) the (i, j)-th entry of Mk, and the decay sets
Dh(M) = ({1, . . . , n} × {1, . . . , n}) \ Sh(M).
8 The case of a full-column rank matrix is treated analogously.
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Theorem 4.2 (Decay rate [7]) Let M be of full row rank, and let [a, b], with a < b, be the smallest interval
containing the spectrum of M . There exist C ∈ R>0 and q ∈ (0, 1) such that
sup{|M†(i, j)| : (i, j) ∈ Dh(MMT)} ≤ Cqh+1.
For a graphGh and two nodes i and j, let dist(i, j) denote the smallest number of edges in a path from j to i inGh. The
following result will be used to prove Theorem 4.1. Recall that, for a matrix M , we have ‖M‖max = max{|M(i, j)|}.
Lemma 4.1 (Decay sets and local neighborhood) Let the matrix H be partitioned as in (9), and let Gh be the
graph associated with H. For i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if dist(i, j) = h, then
‖H†ij‖max ≤ Cq
h
2+1.
PROOF. The proof can be done by simple inspection, and it is omitted here.
Lemma 4.1 establishes a relationship between the decay sets of an invertible matrix and the distance among the
vertices of a graph associated with the same matrix. By using this result, we are now ready to prove Theorem 4.1.
PROOF. [Proof of Theorem 4.1] Notice that, after h iterations of Algorithm 2, the i-th monitor has received data
from the monitors within distance h from i, i.e., from the monitors T such that, for each j ∈ T , there exists a path
of length up to h from j to i in the graph associated with H. Reorder the rows of H such that the i-th block come
first and the T -th blocks second. Let H = [HT1 H
T
2 H
T
3 ]
T be the resulting matrix. Accordingly, let z = [zT1 z
T
2 z
T
3 ]
T,
and let x = [xT1 x
T
2 x
T
3 ]
T, where z = Hx.
Because H has full row rank, we have
H1
H2
H3


P11 P12 P13
P21 P22 P23
P31 P32 P33
 =

I1 0 0
0 I2 0
0 0 I3
 , H† =

P11 P12 P13
P21 P22 P23
P31 P32 P33
 ,
where I1, I2, and I3 are identity matrices of appropriate dimension.For a matrix M , let col(M) denote the number
of columns of M . Let T1 = {1, . . . , col(P11)}, T2 = {1 + col(P11), . . . , col([P11 P12])}, and
T3 = {1 + col([P11 P12]), . . . , col([P11 P12 P13])}.
Let T1, T2, and T3, be, respectively, the indices of the columns of P11, P12, and P13. Notice that, by construction, if
i ∈ T1 and j ∈ T3, then dist(i, j) > h. Then, by virtue of Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 4.2, the magnitude of each entry
of P13 is bounded by C¯q¯
bh2 c+1, for C¯, q¯ ∈ R.
Because H has full row rank, from Theorem 3.1 we have that
xˆ = H†z = ˆ¯x+K1(H3K1)†(z3 −H3xˆ1), (11)
where
ˆ¯x = [HT1 H
T
2 ]
T†[zT1 z
T
2 ]
T and K1 = Basis(Ker([H
T
1 H
T
2 ]
T)).
With the same partitioning as before, let xˆ = [xˆT1 xˆ
T
2 xˆ
T
3 ]
T. In order to prove the theorem, we need to show that there
exists C ∈ R>0 and q ∈ (0, 1) such that
‖xˆ1 − ˆ¯x1‖ ≤ Cqbh2 c+1.
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Fig. 2. In Fig. 2(a), the normalized euclidean norm of the error vector θbus(ε)−θbus,wls is plotted as a function of the parameter
ε, where θbus(ε) is the estimation vector computed according to Theorem 3.2, and θbus,wls is the minimum variance estimate
of θbus. As ε decreases, the vector θbus(ε) converges to the minimum variance estimate θbus,wls. In Fig. 2(b), the IEEE 118 bus
system has been divided into 5 areas. Each area is monitored and operated by a control center. The control centers cooperate
to estimate the state and to assess the functionality of the whole network.
Notice that, for (11) to hold, the matrix K1 can be any basis of Ker([H
T
1 H
T
2 ]
T). Hence, let K1 = [P
T
13 P
T
23 P
T
33].
Because every entry of P13 decays exponentially, the theorem follows.
In Section 5.2 we provide an example to clarify the exponential decay described in Theorem 4.1.
5 An illustrative example
The effectiveness of the methods developed in the previous sections is now shown through some examples.
5.1 Estimation and detection for the IEEE 118 bus system
The IEEE 118 bus system represents a portion of the American Electric Power System as of December, 1962. This
test case system, whose diagram is reported in Fig. 1(b), is composed of 118 buses, 186 branches, 54 generators, and
99 loads. The voltage angles and the power injections at the network buses are assumed to be related through the
linear relation
Pbus = Hbusθbus,
where the matrix Hbus depends upon the network interconnection structure and the network admittance matrix.
For the network in Fig. 1(b), let z = Pbus− v be the measurements vector, where E[v] = 0 and E[vvT] = σ2I, σ ∈ R.
Then, following the notation in Theorem 3.2, the minimum variance estimate of θbus can be recovered as
lim
ε→0+
[Hbus εσI]
†z.
In Fig. 2(a) we show that, as ε decreases, the estimation vector computed according to Theorem 3.2 converges to
the minimum variance estimate of θbus.
In order to demonstrate the advantage of our decentralized estimation algorithm, we assume the presence of 5
control centers in the network of Fig. 1(b), each one responsible for a subpart of the entire network. The situation is
depicted in Fig. 2(b). Assume that each control center measures the real power injected at the buses in its area, and
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Fig. 3. For a fixed value of ε, Fig. 3(a) shows the average (over 100 tests) of the norm of the error (with respect to the network
state) of the estimate obtained by means of Algorithm 1. The estimation error decreases with the number of measurements.
Because of the presence of several control centers, our distributed algorithm processes more measurements (up to 5N¯) while
maintaining the same (or smaller) computational complexity of a centralized estimation (with N¯ measurements). Fig. 3(b)
shows the residual functions computed by the 5 control centers. Since the first residual is greater than the threshold value, the
presence of false data is correctly detected by the first control center. A form of regional identification is possible by simple
identifying the residuals above the security threshold.
let zi = Pbus,i − vi, with E[vi] = 0 and E[vivTi ] = σ2i I, be the measurements vector of the i-th area. Finally, assume
that the i-th control center knows the matrix Hbus,i such that zi = Hbus,iθbus + vi. Then, as discussed in Section 3,
the control centers can compute an optimal estimate of θbus by means of Algorithm 1 or 2. Let ni be the number of
measurements of the i-th area, and let N =
∑5
i=1 ni. Notice that, with respect to a centralized computation of the
minimum variance estimate of the state vector, our estimation procedure obtains the same estimation accuracy while
requiring a smaller computation burden and memory requirement. Indeed, the i-th monitor uses ni measurements
instead of N . Let N¯ be the maximum number of measurements that, due to hardware or numerical contraints,
a control center can efficiently handle for the state estimation problem. In Fig. 3(a), we increase the number of
measurements taken by a control center, so that ni ≤ N¯ , and we show how the accuracy of the state estimate
increases with respect to a single control center with N¯ measurements.
To conclude this section, we consider a security application, in which the control centers aim at detecting the presence
of false data among the network measurements via distributed computation. For this example, we assume that each
control center mesures the real power injection as well the current magnitude at some of the buses of its area. By
doing so, a sufficient redundancy in the measurements is obtained for the detection to be feasible [1]. Suppose that
the measurements of the power injection at the first bus of the first area is corrupted by a malignant agent. To
be more precise, let the measurements vector of the first area be z¯i = zi + e1wi, where e1 is the first canonical
vector, and wi is a random variable. For the simulation we choose wi to be uniformly distributed in the interval
[0, wmax], where wmax corresponds approximately to the 10% of the nominal real injection value. In order to detect
the presence of false data among the measurements, the control centers implement Algorithm 3, where, being H
the measurements matrix, and σ, Σ the noise standard deviation and covariance matrix, the threshold value Γ is
chosen as 2σ‖I−H(HTΣ−1H)−1HTΣ−1‖∞. 9 The residual functions ‖zi−Hxˆ‖∞ are reported in Fig. 3(b). Observe
that, since the first residual is greater than the threshold Γ, the control centers successfully detect the false data.
Regarding the identification of the corrupted measurements, we remark that a regional identification may be possible
by simply analyzing the residual functions. In this example, for instance, since the residuals {2, . . . , 5} are below the
threshold value, the corrupted data is likely to be among the measurements of the first area. This important aspect
is left as the subject of future research.
5.2 Scalability property of our finite-memory estimation technique
Consider an electrical network with (ab)2 buses, where a, b ∈ N. Let the buses interconnection structure be a two
dimensional lattice, and let G be the graph whose vertices are the (ab)2 buses, and whose edges are the network
branches. Let G be partitioned into b2 identical blocks containing a2 vertices each, and assume the presence of b2
control centers, each one responsible for a different network part. We assume the control centers to be interconnected
through an undirected graph. In particular, being Vi the set of buses assigned to the control center Ci, we let the
9 For a Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance σ2, about 95% of the realizations are contained in [µ− 2σ, µ+ 2σ].
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Fig. 4. In Fig. 4(a), a two dimensional power grid with 400 buses. The network is operated by 16 control centers, each one
responsible for a different subnetwork. Control centers cooperate through the red communication graph. Fig. 4(b) shows the
norm of the estimation error of the local subnetwork as a function of the number of iterations of Algorithm 2. The considered
monitors are C1 ,C6, C11, and C15. As predicted by Theorem 4.1, the local estimation error becomes negligible before the
termination of the algorithm.
control centers Ci and Cj be connected if there exists a network branch linking a bus in Vi to a bus in Vj . An example
with b = 4 and a = 5 is in Fig. 4(a). In order to show the effectiveness of our approximation procedure, suppose that
each control center Ci aims at estimating the vector of the voltage angles at the buses in its region. We assume also
that the control centers cooperate, and that each of them receives the measurements of the real power injected at
only the buses in its region. Algorithm 2 is implemented by the control centers to solve the estimation problem. In
Fig. 4(b) we report the estimation error during the iterations of the algorithm. Notice that, as predicted by Theorem
4.1, each leader possess a good estimate of the state of its region before the termination of the algorithm.
6 Conclusion
Two distributed algorithms for network control centers to compute the minimum variance estimate of the network
state given noisy measurements have been proposed. The two methods differ in the mode of cooperation of the
control centers: the first method implements an incremental mode of cooperation, while the second uses a diffusive
interaction. Both methods converge in finite time, which we characterize, and they require only local measurements
and model knowledge to be implemented. Additionally, an asynchronous and scalable implementation of our diffusive
estimation method has been described, and its efficiency has been shown through a rigorous analysis and through
a practical example. Based on these estimation methods, an algorithm to detect cyber-attacks against the network
measurements has also been developed, and its detection performance has been characterized.
APPENDIX
6.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
PROOF. LetHi = [HT1 · · · HTi ]T, zi = [zT1 · · · zTi ]T. We show by induction that zi = Hixˆi,Ki = Basis(Ker(Hi)),
and xˆi ⊥ Ker(Hi). Note that the statements are trivially verified for i = 1. Suppose that they are verified up to i,
then we need to show that Ki+1 = Basis(Ker(H
i+1)), xˆi+1 ⊥ Ker(Hi+1), and zi+1 = Hi+1xˆi+1.
We start by proving that Ki+1 = Basis(Ker(H
i+1)). Observe that Ker(Ki) = 0 for all i, and that
Ker(Hi+1Ki) = {v : Kiv ∈ Ker(Hi+1)}. (A-1)
Hence,
Im(Ki+1) = Im(Ki Ker(Hi+1Ki)) = Im(Ki) ∩Ker(Hi+1) = Ker(Hi) ∩Ker(Hi+1) = Ker(Hi+1).
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We now show that xi+1 ⊥ Ker(Hi+1), which is equivalent to
xˆi+1 = (xˆi +Ki(Hi+1Ki)
†(zi+1 −Hi+1xˆi)) ∈ Ker(Hi+1)⊥.
Note that
Ker(Hi+1) ⊆ Ker(Hi) ⇔ Ker(Hi+1)⊥ ⊇ Ker(Hi)⊥.
By the induction hypothesis we have xˆi ∈ Ker(Hi)⊥, and hence xˆi ∈ Ker(Hi+1)⊥. Therefore, we need to show that
Ki(Hi+1Ki)
†(zi+1 −Hi+1xˆi) ∈ Ker(Hi+1)⊥.
Let w = (Hi+1Ki)
†(zi+1 −Hi+1xˆi), and notice that w ∈ Ker(Hi+1Ki)⊥ due to the properties of the pseudoinverse
operation. Suppose that Kiw 6∈ Ker(Hi+1)⊥. Since Ker(Ki) = {0}, the vector w can be written as w = w1+w2, where
Kiw1 ∈ Ker(Hi+1)⊥ and Kiw2 = Kiw −Kiw1 6= 0, Kiw2 ∈ Ker(Hi+1). Then, it holds Hi+1Kiw2 = 0, and hence
w2 ∈ Ker(Hi+1Ki), which contradicts the hypothesis w ∈ Ker(Hi+1Ki)⊥. FinallyKiw ∈ Ker(Hi+1)⊥ ⊆ Ker(Hi+1)⊥.
We now show that zi+1 = Hi+1xˆi+1. Because of the consistency of the system of linear equations, and because z
i =
Hixˆi by the induction hypothesis, there exists a vector vi ∈ Ker(Hi) = Im(Ki) such that zi+1 = Hi+1(xˆi + vi), and
hence that zi+1 = Hi+1(xˆi+vi). We conclude that (zi+1−Hi+1xˆi) ∈ Im(Hi+1Ki), and finally that zi+1 = Hi+1xˆi+1.
6.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Before proceeding with the proof of the above theorem, we recall the following fact in linear algebra.
Lemma 6.1 Let H ∈ Rn×m. Then Ker((H†)T) = Ker(H).
PROOF. We first show that Ker((H†)T) ⊆ Ker(H). Recall from [2] that H = HHT(H†)T. Let x be such that
(H†)Tx = 0, then Hx = HHT(H†)Tx = 0, so that Ker((H†)T) ⊆ Ker(H). We now show that Ker(H) ⊆ Ker((H†)T).
Recall that (H†)T = (HT)† = (HHT)†H. Let x be such that Hx = 0, then (H†)Tx = (HHT)†Hx = 0, so that
Ker(H) ⊆ Ker((H†)T), which concludes the proof.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.2.
PROOF. The first property follows directly from [2] (cfr. page 427). To show the second property, observe that
C† = 1ε ((I −HH†)B)†, so that
lim
ε→0+
εD = 0.
For the theorem to hold, we need to verify that
H† −H†B((I −HH†)B)† = (HTΣ−1H)−1HTΣ−1,
or, equivalently, that (
H† −H†B((I −HH†)B)†)HH† = (HTΣ−1H)−1HTΣ−1HH†, (A-2)
and (
H† −H†B((I −HH†)B)†) (I −HH†) = (HTΣ−1H)−1HTΣ−1(I −HH†). (A-3)
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Consider equation (A-2). After simple manipulation, we have
H† −H†B((I −HH†)B)†HH† = H†,
so that we need to show only that
H†B((I −HH†)B)†HH† = 0.
Recall that for a matrix W it holds W † = (WTW )†WT. Then the term ((I −HH†)B)†HH† equals
(
((I −HH†)B)T((I −HH†)B))†BT(I −HH†)HH† = 0,
because (I −HH†)HH† = 0. We conclude that equation (A-2) holds. Consider now equation (A-3). Observe that
HH†(I −HH†) = 0. Because B has full row rank, and Σ = BBT, simple manipulation yields
−HT(BBT)−1HH†B [(I −HH†)B]† (I −HH†)B = HT(BBT)−1(I −HH†)B,
and hence
HT(BBT)−1
{
I +HH†B
[
(I −HH†)B]†} (I −HH†)B = 0.
Since HH† = I − (I −HH†), we obtain
HT(BBT)−1B
[
(I −HH†)B]† (I −HH†)B = 0.
A sufficient condition for the above equation to be true is([
(I −HH†)B]†)TBT(BBT)−1H = 0.
From Lemma 6.1 we have.
Ker
(([
(I −AA†)B]†)T) = Ker((I −AA†)B).
Since
(I −HH†)BBT(BBT)−1H = (I −HH†)H = 0,
we have that
HT(BBT)−1B
[
(I −HH†)B]† (I −HH†)B = 0,
and that equation (A-3) holds. This concludes the proof.
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